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Abstract 
This article analyzes the relationship between external aid and economic growth in the ECOWAS 
region, with a focus on bilateral and multilateral aid effects. The key idea behind this analysis is an 
argument of Svensson (2000) that multilateral aid is more effective than bilateral aid because of the 
high degree of altruism of bilateral donors. He therefore suggested a delegation of bilateral aid to 
multilateral institutions. To appreciate his suggestion, this analysis used panel data from the 16 
ECOWAS countries from the period 1984 to 2014. The results of the estimates, based on the dynamic 
least squares estimator (DOLS), show a negative effect of foreign aid on economic growth. This 
negative effect on economic growth persists when the components of aid are introduced into the model. 
In addition, results highlight that governance is a channel through which foreign aid affect positively 
economic growth. In these conditions, bilateral aid is more effective on economic growth than 
multilateral aid. These results about foreign aid received by ECOWAS countries invalidates Svensson’s 
(2000) theory. Therefore, a delegation of bilateral aid to multilateral institutions is not relevant 
because bilateral aid contributes more to economic growth if governance is taken into account. 
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1. Introduction 
Foreign aid in economics theory is considered as an additional resource to domestic resources in order 
to finance economic growth. In Harrod-Domar growth model, for example, foreign resources allow to 
increase investment that leads to increased production. But, as Chenery and Strout (1966) pointed out 
in their two-gap growth model, achievement of a growth objective depends on investments efficiency. 
Taking these factors into account, many studies have examined the issue of foreign aid effectiveness in 
terms of contribution to economic growth in recipient countries. The results of these studies are 
strongly discussed and three major trends emerge from economics literature. 
While some studies concluded that aid does not affect or even negatively affects economic growth 
(Boone, 1994; Easterly, 2003; Easterly, 2008; Gyimah-Brempong et al., 2012; Moyo, 2008), others 
showed a positive relationship between aid and growth (Arndt et al., 2015; Clemensn et al., 2004; 
Galiani et al., 2014; Lof et al., 2015) with a decreasing marginal return of aid (Collier & Dollar, 2001; 
Dalgaard et al., 2004; Durbarry et al., 1998; Hansen & Tarp, 2001). Others else concluded that aid is 
only effective at supporting positive economic growth when recipient countries adopt good economic 
policies (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Chauvet & Guillaumont, 2003). 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a zone whose member countries have 
received foreign aid since their independence. From 1980 to 2016, these countries received aid of about 
14.78% on average their GDP. During the same period, they estimated their GDP per capita of about 
585.07 US dollars with an average evolution of about 2.57% per year. Despite the increased evolution 
of the GDP per capita, it is not clear that foreign aid contributed on it. Indeed, Figure 1 in appendix 
established the relationship between foreign aid and GDP per capita. From this Figure, the trend 
emerging is a negative correlation between these two economic variables. 
Given aid flows received and the relationship between aid and GDP per capita established by the scatter 
plots, and according to the ongoing debate in empirical literature on the issue, we questions the ability 
of foreign aid to promote economic growth in ECOWAS countries. To this main question we can add 
these subsidiary questions. 
1.1 Does Foreign Aid Effect on Economic Growth Depend on Donors? 
This question draws its meaning from the debate about aid effectiveness depending on whether it 
comes from a bilateral or multilateral donor. Indeed, in his model, Svensson (2000) was looking for 
incentive mechanisms to make external aid more effective. He conducted his analysis as a strategic 
game form between donor and recipient, focusing on the problem of moral hazard that affects aid 
efficiency. He concluded that aid from multilateral donors was more effective than that from bilateral 
donors because of their high degree of altruism. Svensson (2000) therefore suggested that bilateral 
donors delegate their aid to multilateral institutions. 
This degree of altruism is expressed mainly through bilateral donors aversion to poverty and their aid 
allocations which strongly depend on their strategic interests (Raschky & Schwindt, 2012). In contrast, 
multilateral institutions are less averse to poverty. Because of their aim, these organizations are focused 
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on economic performance and their aid allocations depend on it (Hagen, 2006; Torsvik, 2005). 
Most time, studies separately analyze the effects of bilateral and multilateral aid without necessarily 
coming to a comparative assessment of their effectiveness on economic growth. Very few authors, to 
our knowledge, have been interested in a comparative analysis of bilateral and multilateral aid 
effectiveness. In this respect, Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) in a classic growth model performed a 
comparative analysis and highlighted differences in effectiveness between bilateral and multilateral aid. 
According to their results, and contrary to Svensson’s results, bilateral aid has a slightly higher effect 
on economic growth than multilateral aid. Wako (2011), using panel data of 42 Sub-Saharan African 
countries for the years 1980 through 2007, appreciated the effect of bilateral and multilateral aid on 
economic growth of these countries. He found that there was no evidence for the (conditional or 
unconditional) effectiveness of both kinds of aid. According to him, bilateral or multilateral aid on their 
own, or in interaction with policy, is ineffective at enhancing economic growth, regardless of whether 
one measures it relative to the recipients’ gross domestic product or in per capita terms. Other authors, 
interested in the issue, went beyond the source of aid and appreciated donors’ own policies for effective 
allocation of aid (Dreher et al., 2015; Gary & Maurel, 2015; Minasyan et al., 2017). The main 
conclusion from their studies is that more coherent donors’ policies are associated with stronger 
economic growth in recipient countries. 
1.2 Does Aid Effectiveness Depend on the Quality of Governance in ECOWAS Countries? 
The interest of this question comes from economic debates on non-linear influence of aid on economic 
growth. This non-linearity results on the one hand from the presence of transmission channels of aid 
effects (Chenery & Strout, 1966; Burnside & Dollar, 2000) and on the other hand from the capacity of 
recipient countries to absorb foreign aid (Collier & Dollar, 2001). 
Several authors have tested the presence of transmission channels in their analysis of aid effect on 
economic growth. Already, Burnside and Dollar (2000) in their study showed that aid would only be 
effective on economic growth in countries with good policies and institutional quality. Several studies 
have undertaken, with varying degrees of success, to confirm these results (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; 
Kosack, 2003; Mosley, 2015). In addition, Collier and Dehn (2001) also found that external shocks 
could also influence aid effect on growth. In this sense, a group of studies concluded that aid was 
effective in countries exposed to macroeconomic fluctuations and large climatic variations (Dalgaard et 
al., 2004; Hudson, 2015), and foreign aid would contribute to mitigate these external shocks effects. 
Regarding absorptive capacity, studies pointed out that too much aid could compromise its efficiency 
on economic development of recipient countries. In this regard, Hansen and Tarp (2001) has shown that 
marginal returns of aid become negative when these flows exceed 25% of GDP, while Lensink and 
White (2001) has set this threshold around 40%. As for Gyimah-Brempong et al. (2012), they found 
that aid effect on economic growth in 77 developing countries is positive only if the level of aid was 
between 6.6 and 14.4% of GDP. 
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The literature on aid effectiveness remains extremely rich and varied. The debate on aid effects is so 
controversial that we can said that there are as many papers exposing a positive relationship between 
aid and growth than papers supporting a negative effect or no significant effect on income growth 
(Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009). This heterogeneity highlights the lack of consensus on aid effects on 
economic growth. 
The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the relationship between economic growth and 
foreign aid, especially taking into account its two main sources: bilateral and multilateral aid. The idea 
is to investigate the effects of bilateral and multilateral aid both in order to assess the complementarity 
that could result from these two modes of aid delivery. This study also examines the role of governance 
in the relationship between external aid and economic growth. Based on this literature, the following 
hypotheses will be tested: 
 Multilateral aid is more efficient to economic growth than bilateral aid; 
 Aid has decreasing marginal effect on economic growth and the quality of governance is a 
channel that improves aid effect. 
As previously reported, the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth has attracted much 
interest in the economic literature. However, very few studies, to our knowledge, have made a 
comparative empirical analysis of the effect by source of aid, especially in ECOWAS. The essential 
contribution of this paper lies in this comparative analysis while appreciating the role of governance. 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
The econometric analysis is based on a traditional neoclassical growth model in open economy, derived 
from the Cobb-Douglas type function. This kind of model is widely used in the empirical literature on 
aid effectiveness. Thus, from this function, Hansen and Tarp (2001) developed a model of aid analysis 
in which income growth depends on aid, investment, and policy variables. This model is used by 
Dalgaard et al. (2004) and Gyimah-Brempong et al. (2012) to analyze the impact of aid on growth in 
developing countries. The results concluded that there was a direct and quadratic relationship between 
aid and income growth and an indirect relationship through investment and through economic policies. 
This analysis of the impact of aid on economic growth in ECOWAS countries draws on this model. The 
interest in using this model is that it allows to take into account the quadratic form of aid and allows aid 
to interact with governance. 
2.1 Model Specification 
With reference to aid-growth literature, the basic equation of economic growth to investigate as 
follows: 
 , 0, 1, , 2, , 3, , ,           1i t i i i t i i t i i t i t i ty A X Z              
Where subscripts “i” and “t” respectively refer to country and to time. “A” defines foreign aid (as a 
percentage of GDP) which is split into bilateral and multilateral component and “Z” represents 
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governance variable. “X” is a vector of control variables. ,,   and i t i t   respectively capture the 
individual-specific effects, the time-specific factors and idiosyncratic error. 
In equation (1), aid is considered as an exogenous variable explaining the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita. However, it is important to point out the complex environment in which aid is allocated and 
analyzed. This complexity, highlighted in Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) study, is explained by the fact 
that aid must be allocated to countries with good institutions. Under such conditions, the possibility of 
endogeneity problem is very likely when estimating relationship between foreign aid and growth. 
Therefore, it would be cautious to take into account the endogenous nature of aid. Moreover, the 
observation of Figure 2 in the appendix, which relates aid to per capita income, shows a non-linear 
dynamic of the general trend curve resulting from scatter plots. Such dynamic suggests a threshold 
effect of aid that it would be interesting to test in this analysis. That is why aid, in equation (2), is 
introduced in quadratic form and interact with governance. 
   2, 0, 1, , 2, , 3, , , 4, , ,*          2i t i i i t i i t i i t i t i i t i t i ty A A Z A X                
2.2 Estimation Issues and Procedures 
The model (2) as presented is a static approach to investigated phenomenon. This approach does not 
allow to take into account the possibility of a dynamic dimension of the phenomenon. This dynamic 
dimension is a significant issue in the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. Indeed, 
in the policies of aid allocation, it’s important to note that donors integrates the level of GDP per capita 
of recipient countries. So foreign aid tends to go to low-income countries. There is therefore a causality 
“income-aid” well-established in economics literature: lower is the country’s income, more aid it 
receives. The study here is about the causality “aid-income”: does aid allow to increase income? The 
possibility of endogeneity problem therefore is very likely that estimation method must take into 
account. 
Conventional estimators (fixed/random effects estimators) that impose the homogeneity of the 
estimated parameters are not appropriate for equation (2) because they can be seriously biased (Pesaran 
& Smith, 1995). Besides, the problem of endogeneity (possibility of double correlation between aid and 
economic growth) needs to be adequately addressed in order to achieve robust estimators. The most 
widely used techniques that take into account these econometric problems are: the Fully Modified (FM) 
and Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS) estimators developed by Chiang and Kao (2002), the error 
correction estimators proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) namely Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and 
Mean Group (MG). 
This study adopts the DOLS estimator because of its superiority (best estimators) on the FM estimator. 
According to Chiang and Kao (2001), on small samples (relatively small size), the DOLS estimator 
provided a better correction of long-term endogeneity bias than the FM estimator. This estimator is an 
extension of Stock and Watson’s (1993) one. To obtain an unbiased estimator of the long term 
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parameters, the DOLS method estimates a parametric correction by including lagged levels as well as 
lagged differences of variables. In other words, the technique consists in including leads and lags of 
,i tX  in the cointegration relationship in order to remove the correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error term. 
Thus, considering the equation (2) and assuming the presence of non-stationary variables, the DOLS 
estimator is provided by the following equation: 
   2
1
, 0 1 , 2 , , , 1 , ,        3
k q
i t i t i t i k i t k i t k i t
k q
y y M y M    

  

         
In this equation (3), ,i tM represents the set of explanatory variables other than , 1i ty  . ,ki  is the 
estimated parameter of anticipation or delay in first difference of the explanatory variables. 
2.3 Description of Variables and Data 
The estimation uses four categories of variables for the analysis: 
 The economic growth appreciated by the growth rate of real GDP per capita. 
 Foreign aid measures the amount of external resources received as official development 
assistance (Aid/GDP). Over the period 1980 to 2016, aid to ECOWAS countries represented about 
14.78% of GDP per year. This aid split up into bilateral and multilateral aid. Bilateral donors are 
represented by single country agencies that provide aid directly to developing countries or NGOs. 
Alternatively, multilateral donors exist where more than two bilateral donors pool their aid flows and, 
through the international organization’s own decision processes that aggregate the member countries’ 
preferences, then provide the aid to developing countries or NGOs. During this period, the most 
important part of this foreign aid was delivered by bilateral donors (57.76%), while multilateral donors 
delivered about 42.24%. Figure 1 below shows the evolution of these two components of foreign aid 
delivered to ECOWAS countries. The main information from this Figure is that, from the 1996s, there 
has been a pronounced fall in the real amount of foreign aid provided by donors for these developing 
countries. Economics literature attributes this pronounced decreasing to the aid fatigue. 
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Figure 1. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid to ECOWAS Countries, 1980-2016 
 
 Governance denotes institutional variables. Many institutions attempted to develop indicators to 
assess governance in countries. Among these institutions, there are the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) developed the World Bank since 1996, and the International Country Risk Guide 
Series (ICRG) which began publication in 1984. This are the latter indicators that are used in this study. 
These indicators are derived from expert surveys of economic and political conditions in about 140 
countries. This study uses the ICRG indicators. The choice for these indicators results from the fact that 
the series are longer than those of other institutions. For the analysis, the governance variable is 
obtained by summing the scores of the 12 ICRG indicators whose maximum score for a country is 100. 
Figure 3 shows the overall level of institutional quality in the ECOWAS countries (Note 2). From 1984 
to 2014, ECOWAS countries was characterized by a low level of governance with an average score 
estimated at 51.69. Nevertheless, there is an improvement in governance during this period because the 
score increased from 45.93 in 1984 to51.75 in 2014. 
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Figure 2. Governance in ECOWAS Countries, 1984-2014 
 
 Control variables relate to investment and financial development valued by the broad money (all 
as a percentage of GDP). They also concern the human capital measured by the active population (as a 
percentage of the total population) and the gross enrollment rate, the economic stability appreciated by 
the rate of inflation. 
We use quantitative data for this analysis coming from three sources. The data relating to foreign aid 
are drawn from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database. The 
data about governance comes from the IRCG database. For control variables, they come from the 
World Bank database. 
 
3. Results and Discussions 
The effects of foreign aid (and split into bilateral and multilateral aid) on economic growth has been 
estimated through the economic growth model presented above. The results relate to stationarity and 
cointegration tests on the one hand and regressions on the other. 
3.1 The Results of Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
To determine the order of integration of variables and examine the presence of a long-term relationship 
between them, the first step of the empirical approach was to perform unit root and cointegration tests. 
For this purpose, two tests developed by Levin et al. (2002) and by Im et al. (2003) were used to assess 
the non-stationarity of the variables. 
The first test, imposing the assumption of homogeneity of the autoregressive root, assume, as null 
hypothesis, a unit root for all the individuals of the panel versus the hypothesis of the absence of unit 
root for the set of individuals. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that in case of rejection of the null 
hypothesis, we can accept the hypothesis of an autoregressive root common to all individuals. 
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The second test responds to this concern by considering a model with individual effects and no 
deterministic trend. It postulates the unit root versus the possibility of cohabitation of two categories of 
individuals in the panel. Individuals for whom the variable is stationary and those for whom it’s not. 
The results of implementing of these two tests are presented in the following Table. 
 
Table 1. Results of Unit Root Tests Applied to the Variables 
Variables LL  IPS  
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
GDP Growth** −0.159 0.366 −1.659 0.989 
Aid* −0.491 0.000 −3.172 0.000 
Bilateral Aid* −0.650 0.000 −3.864 0.000 
Multilateral Aid* −0.640 0.000 −3.760 0.000 
Money* −0.422 0.000 −3.206 0.000 
Inflation* −0.667 0.000 −3.841 0.000 
Investment* −0.321 0.001 −2.542 0.050 
Active pop** −0.108 0.000 −2.471 0.101 
Education** −0.112 0.995 −1.869 0.910 
Governance** −0.213 0.135 −2.099 0.630 
Democraty** −0.188 0.362 −1.860 0.919 
Corruption** −0.244 0.171 −2.143 0.553 
Source: Author. 
IPS = IM-Pesaran-Shin’s test; LL = Levin-Lin-Chu’s test; Stationary at level (*), in first difference 
(**). 
 
The results of the unit root tests show that GDP growth and governance indicators (governance, 
democracy and corruption) are stationary in first difference, while the foreign aid (total aid, bilateral 
and multilateral aid) are stationary at level. For the control variables, investment, broad money and 
inflation are stationary at level; the active population and education being stationary in first difference. 
In order to highlight the long-term relationship between the variables and based on the results of the 
panel unit root test, we use the cointegration tests in panel developed by Westerlund (2007). The tests 
apply to variables that are integrated of order one. The underlying idea is to test the absence of 
cointegration while determining whether each of the individuals in the panel can adopt an error 
correction model. For this, one considers an error correction model in which the parameter ia  
represents the speed of adjustment towards the long-term equilibrium. The model consists of four tests: 
Gt, Ga, Pt and Pa. The first two tests are called group mean tests, and the alternative hypothesis is that 
at least one observation has cointegrated variables. The last two tests are named panel tests and in this 
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case, the alternative hypothesis is that the panel, considered as a whole, is cointegrated. The results are 
presented in the following Table. 
 
Table 2. Results of Cointegration Tests 
Test Value z-Value P-robust Value 
Gt* −1.316 3.509 0.053 
Ga*** −0.711 5.256 0.008 
Pt 2.635 9.046 0.925 
Pa** 0.689 4.481 0.028 
Source: Author. 
(***), (**) and (*) = significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
The results in Table 2 show that the non-cointegration hypothesis is rejected for all statistics except for 
Pt. Considering these results, it can reasonably be concluded that, for part of the sample, the variables 
are notsignificant. 
3.2 Discussion of Estimates Results 
The second step of the empirical analysis was to estimate the economic growth model using the DOLS 
estimator. Estimates have been made taking into account total foreign aid received and its components 
whom are bilateral and multilateral aid. The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 are generally satisfactory. 
Indeed, the Chi tests are significant and the gradual introduction of the interest variables shows a 
certain stability of the model; which is a signal of the estimates robustness. The results from these 
estimates lead to the following conclusions. 
3.2.1 Foreign Aid Is Harmful to Economic Growth, Whether Bilateral or Multilateral 
This conclusion is derived from the results estimated of the basic model provided by columns (I) of 
Table 3. These results, which allow to assess the direct effects of aid, show that foreign aid has negative 
effects on economic growth. For example, a unit increase (as a percentage of GDP) of aid leads to a 
drop in economic growth of 0.064%. These results confirm previous studies of authors who found that 
foreign aid negatively affects the economic growth of recipient countries (Easterly, 2003; 
Gyimah-Brempong et al., 2012; Moyo, 2008). But in looking at its components, the results are only 
significant in multilateral aid. These first results make the validity of the conclusion of Svensson (2000) 
in ECOWAS countries rather subtle. It could be accepted in the sense that only multilateral aid has a 
significant effect on economic growth. However, its negative effects limits the scope of Svensson’s 
thesis in ECOWAS. 
Another interesting result emanating from columns (II) is the non-validation of the threshold effect in 
the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. Indeed, the introduction of the quadratic 
variable of aid (also for bilateral and multilateral aid) modifies the sense of the relationship between aid 
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and economic growth, but the coefficients are notsignificant. 
 
Table 3. Results of the Estimates of Foreign Aid Effects on Economic Growth 
Variable 
Total Foreign Aid Bilateral Aid Multilateral Aid 
(I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
Investment 
0.22*** 
(2.36) 
2.22*** 
(2.48) 
0.21** 
(2.11) 
0.23*** 
(2.40) 
0.21** 
(2.26) 
0.19** 
(2.19) 
Active Pop 
-0.15 
(-0.70) 
-0.14 
(-0.71) 
-0.15 
(-0.66) 
-0.14 
(-0.65) 
-0.15 
(-0.72) 
-0.13 
(-0.66) 
Education 
0.10*** 
(2.37) 
0.09*** 
(2.33) 
0.10** 
(2.25) 
0.10** 
(2.19) 
0.10*** 
(2.37) 
0.08** 
(2.14) 
Aid 
-0.064** 
(-1.94) 
-0.08 
(-1.00) 
-0.08 
(-1.30) 
-0.19 
(-1.29) 
-0.15*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.19* 
(-1.75) 
SquaredAid   
0.003 
(0.50)  
0.001 
(1.08)  
0.001 
(1.27) 
Money 
-0.15*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.15*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.56) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.13*** 
(-2.60) 
Inflation 
-0.07* 
(-1.82) 
-0.05 
(-1.48) 
-0.07* 
(-1.74) 
-0.06 
(-1.51) 
-0.07* 
(-1.83) 
-0.06 
(-1.54) 
Governance 
0.18*** 
(2.56) 
0.16*** 
(2.37) 
0.21*** 
(2.80) 
0.19*** 
(2.57) 
0.17** 
(2.31) 
0.15** 
(2.28) 
Wald Chi2 47.04*** 43.66*** 39.81*** 37.86*** 50.91*** 37.78*** 
Number of Countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Number of Observations 297 297 297 297 297 297 
Source: Author. 
1) provides results of the basic model estimate giving the direct effect of aid on economic growth; 
2) provides the results of the non-linear model estimates (squared aid); 
(***; **; *) indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 
 
3.2.2 Governance Is a Channel That Improves Foreign Aid Effect on Economic Growth 
To appreciate the role of governance, it has been assumed to be a channel through which foreign aid 
affected economic growth. For this purpose, the governance variable was introduced into the model as 
an interacted variable with aid. Columns (III) and (IV) of Table 4 present the results of this test. The 
results in column (III) indicate positive and significant effects at 1% of interaction variables. They 
highlight that governance is a channel through which foreign aid (both bilateral and multilateral aid) 
positively affects economic growth in ECOWAS countries. They thus corroborate the results of 
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Burnside and Dollar (2000; 2004), which showed that aid is effective on economic growth only in 
countries with good governance. These results also indicate that the correlation resulting from the 
interaction between bilateral aid and governance is stronger than that with multilateral aid. Such result 
leads to the conclusion that, in a good governance environment, bilateral aid has a higher positive effect 
on economic growth than multilateral aid. This conclusion is confirmed by the specific governance 
indicators used. Indeed, the results in columns (IV) present democracy and corruption variables crossed 
with foreign aid (total, bilateral and multilateral aid). They indicate a positive and significant 
correlation with economic growth, except for the interaction variable between multilateral aid and 
corruption. They also point out that the interaction variables between bilateral aid and governance 
indicators are stronger correlated with economic growth. These results suggest that by taking into 
account governance, Svensson’s (2000) idea about the predominance of multilateral aid effect (as 
opposed to bilateral aid effect) on economic growth could not be validated in ECOWAS countries. On 
the contrary, it could be argued that good governance contributes to eliminate the aid negative effect on 
economic growth resulting of the basic model estimates and to minimize the altruism negative effect of 
bilateral donors on their aid effectiveness. 
 
Table 4. Results of Regressions of Aid Effects with Emphasis on the Role of Governance 
Variables 
Total Foreign Aid Bilateral Aid Multilateral Aid 
(III) (IV) (III) (IV) (III) (IV) 
Investment 0.12* (1.72) 0.14** (1.96) 0.15 (1.46) 0.19* (1.84) 0.08 (0.97) 0.18** (2.02) 
Active Pop -0.10 (-0.64) -0.08 (-0.52) -0.09 (-0.40) -0.08 (-0.39) -0.12 (-0.60) -0.10 (-0.53) 
Education 0.06** (2.12) 0.05* (1.76) 0.06 (1.28) 0.05 (1.11) 0.08** (2.08) 0.06* (1.70) 
Aid -0.52*** (-8.38) -0.44*** (-9.00) -0.86*** (-7.25) -0.92*** (-8.27) -0.55*** (-7.66) -0.50*** (-7.62) 
Money -0.15*** (-3.68) 0.11*** (-2.77) -0.08 (-1.39) -0.05 (-0.95) -0.10** (-2.13) 0.07* (-1.71) 
Inflation -0.03 (-1.14) -0.04 (-1.33) -0.02 (-0.47) -0.03 (-0.73) -0.05* (-1.44) -0.01 (-0.44) 
Aid*governance 0.009*** (7.82) 
 
0.009*** (7.64) 
 
0.005*** (5.63) 
 
Aid*corruption   0.07*** (2.99) 
 
0.10*** (2.82) 
 
0.0008 
(0.03) 
Aid*democraty   0.04*** (3.84)   0.05*** (3.17)   0.04*** (2.92) 
Wald Chi2 120.46*** 132.13*** 76.46*** 108.72*** 72.71*** 74.03*** 
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Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Number of observations 297 297 297 297 297 297 
Source: Author. 
(III) and (IV) provide results of the non-linear model estimates (foreign aid interacting with governance 
indicators);  
(***; **; *) indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to evaluate foreign aid effect on the economic growth in the ECOWAS 
countries, especially taking into account the components of this aid (bilateral and multilateral), and the 
role of governance. Empirical results based on a dynamic panel data approach indicate a negative 
correlation between foreign aid and economic growth, regardless of component of aid. Testing the 
possibility of a reversal effect, the results indicate a modification of sign of the squared aid but its 
coefficient is not significant. In these conditions, the hypothesis of the presence of threshold effects in 
the correlation between aid and economic growth cannot be validated because of the non-significance 
of the squared aid coefficient. 
In addition, the introduction of governance as an interaction variable with foreign aid shows a positive 
effect on economic growth. This result constitutes the signature that governance can be considered as a 
channel through which foreign aid has positive effect on economic growth. And this positive channel is 
maintained with the governance indicators used that are corruption and democracy. With these results, 
we note that contrary to the theory of Svensson (2000), bilateral aid has a stronger correlation with 
economic growth than multilateral aid in ECOWAS economies if governance is taken into account in 
the analysis. These different results suggest that ECOWAS countries have an interest in focusing on 
governance as it is a channel to improve foreign aid effect on economic growth. The idea of delegating 
bilateral aid to multilateral institutions as suggested by Svensson (2000) therefore does not seem 
relevant. On the contrary, the results suggest a reverse delegation, in a good governance environment. 
 
References 
Arndt, C., Jones, S., & Tarp, F. (2015). Assessing foreign aid’s long-run contribution to growth and 
development. World Development, 69, 6-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.016 
Boone, P. (1994). The impact of foreign aid on savings and growth, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, Centre for Economic Performance. 
Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, policies, and growth. American economic review, 90, 847-868. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.4.847 
Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2004). Aid, policies, and growth: Reply. American economic review, 94, 
781-784. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464524 
Chauvet, L., & Guillaumont, P. (2003). Aid and growth revisited: Policy, economic vulnerability and 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape                  Advances in Politics and Economic                   Vol. 2, No. 1, 2019 
64 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
political instability. ABCDE, 95-95. 
Chenery, H. B., & Strout, A. M. (1966). Foreign assistance and economic development. The American 
Economic Review, 56, 679-733. 
Chiang, M.-H., & Kao, C. (2001). On the estimation and inference of a cointegrated regression in panel 
data. In Nonstationary panels, panel cointegration, and dynamic panels, Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited (pp. 179-222). 
Chiang, M.-H., & Kao, C. (2002). Nonstationary panel time series using NPT 1.3—A user guide. 
Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University. 
Clemens, M., Radelet, S., Bhavnani, R., & Bazzi, S. (2004). Counting chickens when they hatch: The 
short term effect of aid on growth. Economic Journal, 122, 590-617. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02482.x 
Collier, P., & Dehn, J. (2001). Aid, shocks, and growth. World Bank Publications. 
https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2688 
Collier, P., & Dollar, D. (2001). Can the world cut poverty in half? How policy reform and effective aid 
can meet international development goals. World Development, 29, 1787-802. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00076-6 
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2002). Aid, policy, and growth in post-conflict societies. The World Bank. 
https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2902 
Dalgaard, C.-j., Hansen, H., & Tarp, F. (2004). On the empirics of foreign aid and growth. Economic 
Journal, 114, 191-216. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00219.x 
Doucouliagos, H., & Paldam, M. (2009). The aid effectiveness literature: The sad results of 40 years of 
research. Journal of Economic Surveys, 23, 433-461. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2008.00568.x 
Dreher, A., Minasyan, A., & Nunnenkamp, P. (2015). Government ideology in donor and recipient 
countries: Does ideological proximity matter for the effectiveness of aid? European Economic 
Review, 79, 80-92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.07.004 
Durbarry, R., Gemmell, N., & Greenaway, D. (1998). New evidence on the impact of foreign aid on 
economic growth. Technical. 
Easterly, W. (2003). Can foreign aid buy growth?. Journal of economic Perspectives, 17, 23-48. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003769204344 
Easterly, W. R. (2008). Reinventing foreign aid, Cambridge MA MIT Press. 
Galiani, S., Knack, S., Xu, L. C., & Zou, B. (2014). The effect of aid on growth: Evidence from a 
quasi-experiment. The World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6865 
Gary, A., & Maurel, M. (2015), “Donors’ policy consistency and economic growth,” Kyklos, 68, 
511-551. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12092 
Gyimah-Brempong, K., Racine, J. S., & Gyapong, A. (2012). Aid and economic growth: Sensitivity 
analysis. Journal of International Development, 24, 17-33. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1708 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape                  Advances in Politics and Economic                   Vol. 2, No. 1, 2019 
65 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Hagen, R. J. (2006). Samaritan agents? On the strategic delegation of aid policy. Journal of 
Development Economics, 79, 249-263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.11.009 
Hansen, H., & Tarp, F. (2001). Aid and growth regressions. Journal of development Economics, 64, 
547-570. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00150-4 
Hudson, J. (2015). Consequences of aid volatility for macroeconomic management and aid 
effectiveness. World Development, 69, 62-74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.010 
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H., & Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. Journal of 
econometrics, 115, 53-74. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(03)00092-7 
Kosack, S. (2003). Effective aid: How democracy allows development aid to improve the quality of life. 
World development, 31, 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00177-8 
Lensink, R., & White, H. (2001). Are there negative returns to aid?,. Journal of development Studies, 
37, 42-65. https://doi.org/10.1080/713601082 
Lessmann, C., & Markwardt, G. (2010). Decentralization and Foreign Aid Effectiveness: Do Aid 
Modality and Federal Design Matter in Poverty Alleviation? 
Levin, A., Lin, C.-F., & Chu, C.-S. J. (2002). Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and finite-sample 
properties. Journal of econometrics, 108, 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(01)00098-7 
Lof, M., Mekasha, T. J., & Tarp, F. (2015). Aid and income: Another time-series perspective. World 
Development, 69, 19-30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.015 
Minasyan, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Richert, K. (2017). Does aid effectiveness depend on the quality of 
donors? World Development, 100, 16-30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.07.023 
Mosley, P. (2015). Fiscal composition and aid effectiveness: A political economy model. World 
development, 69, 106-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.020 
Moyo, D. (2008). “L’Aide fatale. Les ravages d’une aide inutile et de nouvelles solutions pour 
l’Afrique. Économie et Solidarités, 39, 158-159. https://doi.org/10.7202/044113ar 
Pesaran, M. H., & Smith, R. (1995). Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic heterogeneous 
panels. Journal of econometrics, 68, 79-113. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01644-F 
Raschky, P. A., & Schwindt, M. (2012). On the channel and type of aid: The case of international 
disaster assistance. European Journal of Political Economy, 28, 119-131. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.07.001 
Stock, J. H., & Watson, M. W. (1993). A simple estimator of cointegrating vectors in higher order 
integrated systems. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 783-820. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2951763 
Svensson, J. (2000). When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality. Journal 
of development economics, 61, 61-84. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00061-9 
Torsvik, G. (2005). Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate? Journal of development 
Economics, 77, 503-515. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.05.008 
Wako, H. A. (2011). Effectiveness of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa: Does disaggregating aid into 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape                  Advances in Politics and Economic                   Vol. 2, No. 1, 2019 
66 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
bilateral and multilateral components make a difference?. Journal of Economics and international 
finance, 3, 801-817. 
Westerlund, J. (2007). Testing for error correction in panel data. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
statistics, 69, 709-748. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.2007.00477.x 
 
Notes 
Note 1. Economic Community of West African States. 
Note 2. Two ECOWAS countries (Benin and Cape Verde) do not appear in the ICRG database. 
 
Appendix 1 
Linking the Foreign Aid Evolution with That of the GDP per Capita over the Period 1980-2016 
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Appendix 2  
Highlighting of the Non-Linear Relationship between Foreign Aid and GDP per Capita over the 
Period 1980-2016 
 
 
 
